Research
The molecular life sciences – biophysics, biochemistry, and structural and molecular biology – offer untapped potential for philosophy of science. My research examines epistemological, methodological, and historical questions that arise in these sciences, and it considers how debates from philosophy of science must be adapted to fit this molecular and often biomedical context. My research has three major strands. The first examines explanatory practices in molecular and structural biology. The second strand evaluates reduction, unification, and other strategies for dealing with epistemic and methodological challenges posed by working at the intersection of biology, physics, and chemistry. The third considers conceptual issues in the evolution of proteins. It explores how new knowledge of protein dynamics poses a problem for existing accounts of biological function.
Explanation in the Molecular Life Sciences: My primary research project examines recent changes in representation and explanation introduced to account for the dynamic behavior of biomolecules. I focus on the shift from static to dynamic representations of proteins in the late twentieth century and the subsequent transition from mechanistic to ensemble explanations. I introduce a novel account of explanation – ensemble explanation – to the philosophical literature. Increasingly common in structural biology, ensemble explanations capture protein dynamics by representing proteins not as single, rigid structures but as ensembles of structurally distinct microstates. They cite changes in the equilibrium distribution of these microstates, rather than changes in structure, to explain protein behaviors. I argue that they are a special type of causal explanation, more related to thermodynamic explanations than previous mechanistic explanations of proteins. My account undermines claims that mechanistic explanation is the predominant type of explanation in the molecular life sciences (Machamer et al. 2000) and shows how scientists had to develop new explanatory strategies to account for the complexity of dynamics.
Reduction and Unification: My second research strand evaluates the success of methodological and epistemic strategies, such as reduction, unification, and integration, in solving the problem of connecting biological knowledge from different perspectives. One major aim of this research is to identify the limits of reductionism and reductionist research in the molecular life sciences. Another aim is to analyze how scientists working at the intersection of biology, chemistry, and physics combine these perspectives in the context of intervention. My paper, “When Causal Specificity Doesn’t Matter (Much),” examines how scientists navigate this intersection when the goal is therapeutic intervention. With pragmatic research of this sort, I aim to use philosophy of science to address practical questions that can help evaluate scientific interventions and inform the methodological choices of scientists.
Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology: My third area of research concerns conceptual puzzles in evolutionary biology as well as problems in accounts of biological function that arise from the discovery of protein dynamics. The recognition of the importance of protein dynamics upended the old structure-function rule, which postulated that the structure of a biological macromolecule determined its function. It has reintroduced evolutionary questions into molecular and structural biology: scientists now often claim that proteins were selected not just for their structure but also for their dynamic properties. This focus on dynamics and evolution poses a problem for philosophical accounts of biological function. Cummins-style (1975) functionalism, which claims that the function of a part is the contribution it makes to a capacity of a system, captures the logic behind the structure-function rule. Unlike etiological accounts, however, it makes no mention of the capacity’s evolutionary origins. There is thus a need for a new account of function in the molecular life sciences that can incorporate aspects of both accounts. I am working to develop just such an account.
Reduction and Unification: My second research strand evaluates the success of methodological and epistemic strategies, such as reduction, unification, and integration, in solving the problem of connecting biological knowledge from different perspectives. One major aim of this research is to identify the limits of reductionism and reductionist research in the molecular life sciences. Another aim is to analyze how scientists working at the intersection of biology, chemistry, and physics combine these perspectives in the context of intervention. My paper, “When Causal Specificity Doesn’t Matter (Much),” examines how scientists navigate this intersection when the goal is therapeutic intervention. With pragmatic research of this sort, I aim to use philosophy of science to address practical questions that can help evaluate scientific interventions and inform the methodological choices of scientists.
Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology: My third area of research concerns conceptual puzzles in evolutionary biology as well as problems in accounts of biological function that arise from the discovery of protein dynamics. The recognition of the importance of protein dynamics upended the old structure-function rule, which postulated that the structure of a biological macromolecule determined its function. It has reintroduced evolutionary questions into molecular and structural biology: scientists now often claim that proteins were selected not just for their structure but also for their dynamic properties. This focus on dynamics and evolution poses a problem for philosophical accounts of biological function. Cummins-style (1975) functionalism, which claims that the function of a part is the contribution it makes to a capacity of a system, captures the logic behind the structure-function rule. Unlike etiological accounts, however, it makes no mention of the capacity’s evolutionary origins. There is thus a need for a new account of function in the molecular life sciences that can incorporate aspects of both accounts. I am working to develop just such an account.